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G8 PRINCIPLES: IDENTIFYING THE ANONYMOUS 
Max Biedermann* 
 
 
 
 
 
 Over two million companies and thousands of banks call offshore tax 
havens home.1 It is unknown exactly how much money is hidden, but 
estimates range as high as twenty trillion dollars.2 Over the past few 
years, the international community, and especially the United States, has 
focused on the battle to expose these offshore bank accounts. 3 Much 
progress has been made, as evidenced by the fact that the once highly 
secretive Swiss banking system has officially issued an “unusually direct 
apology for their role in helping tax cheats, following a landmark 
settlement with U.S. authorities.”4 Bank secrecy attracts headlines due to 
high profile cases involving millionaires and billionaires caught hiding 
their fortunes.5 However, another vehicle that allows tax evasion, money 
laundering, and other financial crimes, which has not properly been 
addressed by the international community until recently,6 is the use of 
shell corporations and other corporate vehicles to hide the true owners of 
assets. “In the past, people hid their involvement with funds through 
anonymous bank accounts or accounts in fictitious names;”7 but now that 
this option has been limited due to increased pressure on jurisdictions 
                                                        
*J.D. Candidate 2015, University of North Carolina School of Law; Note and Comment Editor 
of North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation. The author would like 
to thank his family for their support throughout the writing of this note and Josh Becker, J.D. 
Candidate 2015, University of Miami School of Law, for his tax and editing insights.  
1  The Missing $20 Trillion, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571873-how-stop-companies-and-people-dodging-tax-
delaware-well-grand-cayman-missing-20. 
2 See id.  
3 For discussion, see Itai Greenberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 304 (2012).  
4  Swiss Banks Apologize for Assisting Tax Cheats, REUTERS, Sep. 3, 2013 7:18 am, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-usa-tax-switzerland-idUSBRE97S14B20130903. For 
more discussion on Swiss sovereignty and international banking, see Helga Turku, The International 
System of States' Checks and Balances on State Sovereignty: The Case of Switzerland, 38 N.C.J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 809 (2013). 
5 For example, Ty Warner, the creator of Beanie Babies and the 209th richest American, with 
an estimated net worth of 2.9 billion, recently admitted to committing tax evasion. He agreed to pay 
a $53 million dollar fine as a result of being caught "hid[ing] more than $3m (£1.9m) of income in a 
secret Swiss bank account.” See Beanie Babies creator Ty Warner to admit tax evasion, BBC NEWS, 
Sep. 18, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24155274.  
6 See G8 Summit, Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, June 17-18, 2013, G8 
Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of Companies and Legal Arrangements, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-
companies-and-legal-arrangements/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-companies-
and-legal-arrangements [hereinafter G8 Principles].  
7 EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON, JI WON 
PARK, & J.C. SHARMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS 29 (2010), available at 
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821388945 [hereinafter PUPPET MASTERS].  
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with secretive banking practices to turn over records,8 the new preferred 
method for those seeking anonymity is to use a corporate vehicle.9  
 The anonymity that corporate vehicles provide is often abused by 
those seeking nefarious ends. For example, Viktor Bout was placed on 
Interpol’s wanted list for charges of money laundering in 2002.10 The 
United States government also suspected Bout of being the major source 
of arms in African conflicts, such as Sierra Leon, and as an arms supplier 
for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.11 Even though Bout was a 
well-known arms merchant and embargo buster,12 he was able to carry 
on his business until he was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand in 2008.13 
One way that Bout was able to stay ahead of law enforcement was by 
using corporate vehicles registered in jurisdictions around the world to 
constantly move assets. 14  The question remains, how was this arms 
dealer and member of Interpol’s wanted list able to register corporate 
vehicles and use them for illicit purposes?  
 One problem with anonymous corporate vehicles is that people and 
organizations can use them for nefarious purposes without leaving a 
paper trail.15 While many of these cases involve corruption, it is difficult 
for authorities to catch those responsible because of the difficulty 
tracking down the owners of corporate vehicles in some jurisdictions.16 
Because governments have trouble dealing with this issue, third parties 
have resorted to more unconventional measures. 17  One of the most 
successful attempts to reveal the anonymous ownership of corporate 
vehicles was carried out by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Reporters, when it revealed two million documents that exposed the 
ownership of “thousands of companies and trusts set up in the British                                                         
8 See, e.g., Turku, supra note 4, at 268-71 (discussing the domestic and international forces that 
have changed Swiss banking laws).  
9 A corporate vehicle “is mainly used to refer to companies (or corporations), foundations and 
trusts, and national variations of these.” See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 29.  
10 See Kathi Austin, Illicit Arms Brokers: Aiding and Abetting Atrocities, 9 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 203 (2002). 
11 See DOUGLAS FARAH, MERCHANT OF DEATH: MONEY, GUNS, PLANES, AND THE MAN WHO 
MAKES WAR POSSIBLE 5 (2008).  
12 See Austin, supra note 10, at 203.  
13  See Jonathan Stempel, Russian Arms Dealer Viktor Bout's U.S. Conviction Upheld, 
REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-usa-crime-bout-
idUSBRE98Q0PG20130927.  
14 See FARAH, supra note 11, at 9 (stating that Bout registered shell companies in such places 
as Texas, Florida, and Delaware).  
15 Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., It’s Time to Eliminate Anonymous Shell Companies, REUTERS, Oct. 9, 
2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/09/its-time-to-eliminate-anonymous-shell-
companies/. 
16 For example, in 2002, the Kenyan government chose to pay 31.39 million Euros to a holding 
company incorporated in the United Kingdom called Anglo-Leasing to set up a new passport 
printing system, instead of choosing a 6 million Euros bid from a French company. Anglo-Leasing 
subcontracted the work out to the French company. When “whistle-blowers suggested that corrupt 
senior politicians planned to pocket the excess fund from the deal . . . [a]ttempts to investigate these 
allegations were frustrated [] when it proved impossible to find out who controlled Anglo-Leasing.” 
See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 1. 
17 Some countries have resorted to purchasing information on beneficiaries that is stolen by 
bank insiders. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 315. 
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Virgin Islands and Cook Islands.” 18  Times appear to be changing, 
however, and governments seem willing to properly address the 
problems created by anonymous corporate vehicles. 19  After the June 
2013 summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, the G8 20  announced 
action plan principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal 
arrangements (hereinafter “G8 Principles”). These Principles aim to 
establish new international norms that will help combat the abuse of 
anonymous corporate vehicles.21 
 This note will argue that the G8 Principles’ increased reporting and 
recording requirements of the identities of corporate beneficiaries, and 
the G8’s support of an automatic exchange of information between tax 
authorities, are major steps in policing tax avoidance, money laundering, 
and other financial crimes involving anonymous corporate vehicles. This 
note is organized in three parts. Part I will delve deeper into the problems 
related to tracking the anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles. It 
will also examine the steps that the international community has already 
taken in an attempt to combat this issue. Part II will breakdown the G8 
Principles outlined in the action plan. Finally, Part III will discuss how 
the G8’s Principles will likely affect criminal uses of anonymous 
corporate vehicles.  
 
I. TRACKING ANONYMOUS BENEFICIARIES 
A. Defining a Beneficiary 
Beneficial ownership of an asset first originated as a legal concept in 
the United Kingdom. 22  A beneficiary is a person who “ultimately 
controls an asset and can benefit from it.”23 The Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) has defined beneficial ownership as follows: a 
“[b]eneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns 
or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a 
transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who 
exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.”24                                                         
18  Id. See Leaky Devils, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2013, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576146-tax-havens-start-reassess-their-
business-models-leaky-devils. The list of owners included a range of people “from Asian politicians 
to Canadian lawyers—and no fewer than 4,000 Americans.” Id. 
19 For discussion on some recent actions from governments see infra part I section C.  
20 The G8 includes: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United States of America, 
and the United Kingdom. See UK Presidency of G8 2013, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/g8-2013 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
21 See G8 Principles, supra note 6.  
22 For a brief discussion on the origins of beneficiaries in trust law, see PUPPET MASTERS, 
supra note 7, at 18. 
23 Id.  
24 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, International Standards on Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations 
110 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter 
FATF Recommendations].  
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There are two key concepts espoused by the FATF definition that make it 
especially applicable to the fight against anonymous corporate vehicles. 
First, it refers to the fact that “a beneficial owner is always a natural 
person.” 25  This point acknowledges that there is always a person or 
group of people who stand to benefit from a corporate vehicle. 
Consequently, these people need to be identified in order to effectively 
fight their nefarious purposes. 26  Second, beneficial ownership 
encompasses “control over a legal person or arrangement,” which 
extends the definition of a beneficiary to those who control corporate 
vehicles such as shell corporations.27 
 
B. Where Are Beneficiaries Hiding? 
 
 In order to understand the scope of this issue, it is necessary to 
discuss where beneficiaries hide. Some of the most utilized corporate 
vehicles are trusts, 28  foundations, 29  and corporations. 30  This note will 
focus on the corporate vehicle known as a shell company, which is “the 
most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes, 
busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism.”31  
 In 2011, the World Bank conducted a study of 213 large-scale 
corruption cases and determined that over 70% of them relied on shell 
companies.32 The FATF defines a shell company as one that has “no 
significant assets or operations.”33 Shell companies typically do not have 
a physical presence (outside of a mailing address), hire employees, or 
produce independent economic value. 34  It is not uncommon to find 
hundreds, if not thousands, of shell companies registered to the same 
address, because most shell companies do not have operations.35 A shell 
company’s ownership can be structured in a variety of forms, including                                                         
25 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 19. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 21.  
28 For discussion on the use of trusts, see PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 44–47. 
29 For discussion on the use of foundations, see id. at 47–48. 
30 See id. at 51. 
31 MICHAEL FINDLEY, DAVID NIELSON, & JASON SHARMAN, GLOBAL SHELL GAMES: TESTING 
MONEY LAUNDERERS’ AND TERRORIST FINANCIERS’ ACCESS TO SHELL COMPANIES 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter SHELL GAMES]; see also DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND 
MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 2 (2006) (finding, for example, that domestic 
shell companies in the United States allow for billions of dollars’ worth of international wire 
transfers to be conducted by unknown beneficiaries). It should be noted that not all shell companies 
are set up for illicit purposes; legitimate purposes include business finance, mergers and acquisitions, 
or estate and tax planning. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE 
VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 1 (2006) [hereinafter FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE]. 
32  GLOBAL WITNESS, ANONYMOUS COMPANIES 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-global-witness-briefing.  
33 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 24.  
34 See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 4 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf.  
35 For example, one building in the Grand Caymans known as Ugland House is officially the 
registered home of 18,000 companies. See The Missing $20 trillion, supra note 1.  
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having shares “issued to a natural or legal person or in registered or 
bearer form.” 36  Bearer shares provide for an additional amount of 
anonymity because they allow for anonymous transfers of ownership.37 
This is because whoever is in physical possession of the shares is the 
owner of the company.38 
 Setting up a shell company has become easier in modern times 
because “[s]hell companies can be set up online in dozens of countries in 
days or even hours for as little as a few hundred dollars.”39 There are a 
multitude of corporate service providers available over the Internet that 
will take care of all the necessary paperwork. 40  For a fee, corporate 
service providers offer nominee service, a certificate of incorporation, a 
corporate seal, minutes of board meetings, a registry of directors, and a 
variety of other corporate documents.41 
 In many instances, little information must be provided to legally set 
up a company. For example, in the United States, 
 
[a] person who wants to set up a U.S. company typically 
provides less information than is required to open a bank 
account or get a driver’s license. In most cases, they do 
not have to provide the name, address or proof of 
identification of a single owner of the new company.42  
 
Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where there are requirements to obtain 
information about the beneficiaries of corporate vehicles, the rules are 
                                                        
36 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 1.  
37 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 41.  
38 See id. Bearer shares have recently been restricted in many jurisdictions. For example, in 
August 2013 the government of Panama enacted a new law that immobilizes bearer shares, which 
means that the owner of the shares must appoint a guard, who can identify the beneficiary of the 
shares, to hold the shares in Panama. See Panama’s government approves bearer shares 
immobilization law, SOCIETY OF TRUST AND ESTATE PRACTITIONERS, Aug. 27, 2013, 
http://www.step.org/panama%E2%80%99s-government-approves-bearer-shares-immobilization-
law. 
39 SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at 6. For example, “[m]ost U.S. States offer electronic services 
that incorporate a new company and many will set up a new company in less than twenty-four hours. 
The median fee is less than $100. In Delaware and Nevada, for an extra $1,000, an applicant can set 
up a company in less than an hour. Colorado, which incorporates about 5,000 companies each 
month, told the Subcommittee that it now sets up ninety-nine percent of its companies by computer 
without any human intervention or review of the information provided.” Failure to Identify 
Company Owners Impedes Law Enforcement: S. Hrg. 109-845 Before Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2007) 
(opening statement of Senator Levin) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing]. 
40 See, e.g., List of International Corporate Service Providers, SEYCHELLES INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS AUTHORITY, http://www.siba.net/index.php?s=links-icsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) 
(listing sixty-five corporate service providers that will set up a company in the Seychelles); ACSP 
Members, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE SERVICE PROVIDERS, 
http://www.acsp.co.im/memberdb.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (listing 96 corporate service 
providers that will set up a company in the Isle of Mann).  
41  See Max Heywood, How to Set up an Offshore Company in Ten Minutes, Space for 
Transparency, (Apr. 9, 2013), http://blog.transparency.org/2013/04/09/how-to-set-up-an-offshore-
company-in-10-minutes/. 
42 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 4.  
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often not followed.43  
 Shelf companies are a subcategory of shell companies. Shelf 
companies are aptly named because they are shell companies that have 
been “aged” to add to their credibility. They are available for purchase 
off of a figurative “shelf” from a corporate service provider.44 Once a 
shelf company is purchased, the buyer may acquire the company’s credit 
and tax history, which further increases its credibility. 45 This lack of 
accurate and recorded information about shell companies means “[s]hell 
companies [] cannot be linked back to the real individuals in control.”46 
This “create[s] near-insuperable obstacles for regulators and law 
enforcement officials,”47 and frustrates international efforts to increase 
transparency because there simply is no information to disclose to other 
countries when they request it.48 
 
C. Existing International Regulations Attempting to Track 
Beneficiaries 
 
 “Most governments of major developed countries agree that access 
to information from other countries is vital to the full and fair 
enforcement of their tax laws.”49 As a result, individual states and the 
international community as a whole have attempted to stop the abuse of 
corporate vehicles by creating laws and agreements that are designed to 
help identify anonymous corporate beneficiaries. This section will 
explore the following three recent developments that have attempted to 
identify anonymous beneficiaries: (1) the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD) Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital; (2) the FATF Recommendations; and (3) the 
United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). 
  
                                                        
43 In 2012 the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University published the 
results of a study that was conducted to test “whether international rules are actually effective when 
they mandate those selling shell companies must collect identifying documents from their 
customers.” To gather evidence, the study sent out “more than 7,200 email solicitations to more than 
3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries.” It found 
that “nearly forty-eight percent of all replies received did not ask for proper identifications, and 
twenty-two percent did not ask for any identity documents at all.” SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at 
summary. 
44 See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 5; see also Shelf List, Nevada First Holdings, 
http://www.nevadafirst.com/shelfreport.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (containing a list of 51 
registered shell companies some of which already have bank accounts); see also Shell List, Panama 
Offshore Center, http://www.panamaoffshorecenter.com/?cnt=14 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) 
(containing a an available shell company in Panama that was incorporated in 1985).  
45 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 37. 
46 SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at 6. 
47  Id.; see, e.g., Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 6 (“Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement officials reported that a Nevada-based corporation received more than 3,700 suspicious 
wire transfers totaling $81 million over two years but the case was not pursued because the Agency 
was unable to identify the corporation's owners.”). 
48 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7.  
49 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 313.  
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1. OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD Model Treaty) is the “world's dominant model tax treaty.” 50 
While some commentators believe that the OECD Model Treaty actually 
enables shell companies;51 the treaty does provide for a mechanism that 
is designed to allow states to identify and track beneficiaries. Articles 1 
and 3 of the OECD Model Treaty identify the individuals that are 
covered by the treaty. Article 1 states that the treaty applies “to persons 
who are residents of one or both of the contracting states.” 52  The 
definition of person is clarified in Article 3 to include a company, and a 
company is defined as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as 
body corporate for tax purposes.”53 Therefore, this treaty would apply to 
many of the corporate vehicles that are used by anonymous beneficiaries.  
Article 26 (updated in 2012) is the key article that was designed to 
aid authorities in pursuing claims against anonymous beneficiaries. 
Article 26 covers the rules regarding the exchange of information that is 
“foreseeably relevant” to the requesting state’s domestic tax laws.54 The 
standard of “foreseeably relevant” is intended to require the exchange of 
a wide range of information. 55  The OECD Model Treaty does not 
designate when states should exchange information, instead leaving it to 
the treaty partners to decide.56 Between states where there is a mutual 
agreement to exchange information, the article “requires information 
exchange only upon request, while permitting but not requiring 
automatic information exchange.”57  
In addition, Article 26 allows situations where states will not be 
forced to provide information. Three important situations include the 
following: First, states will not be forced to provide information when 
the state would be required “to carry out administrative measures at 
variance with the laws and administrative practice of that . . . State.” 
Second, relief is provided in situations where the state would be required 
“to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the 
normal course of the administration of that . . . State.” Third, information 
does not need to be disclosed when disclosure of that information would                                                         
50 Id. at 314. 
51 See, e.g., Lee Sheppard: Don't Sign OECD Model Tax Treaties!, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, 
(May 31, 2013), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2013/05/lee-sheppard-dont-sign-oecd-model-
tax.html. 
52 OECD, Model Tax on Income and Capital 2010 (updated 2010) M-6, OECD Publishing, 
Date of signing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/978926417517-en. 
53 Id. at M-9.  
54  OECD, UPDATE TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION AND ITS 
COMMENTARY 1 [hereinafter OECD, UPDATE 2012], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/latestdocuments/120718_Article 26-ENG no cover 
(2).pdf. 
55 OLIVER R. HOOR, THE OECD TAX CONVENTION: A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
233 (2010).  
56 ANGHARAD MILLER & LYNNE OATS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 7.44 (3d 
ed. 2012), available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/books/9781847668790/chapter07#null.  
57 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314. 
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be “contrary to public policy.”58 These exceptions can be important when 
it comes to tracking beneficiaries, especially when recording the identity 
of a beneficiary is not “in the normal course of administration of that . . . 
State.”59 It is often the case that, even after a successful request has been 
made, there is no information on file to share with a requesting party and 
no obligation for the requestee to gather that information for the 
requestor.60 
Furthermore, OECD standards do not permit requesting states to 
search for potential abuses by its citizens through “fishing expeditions.”61 
Originally, the restriction on “fishing expeditions” was understood to 
limit requests to those “about specific taxpayers, identified by name.”62 
However, the commentary to the 2012 update to Article 26 expanded the 
definition  “fishing expeditions.”63 According to the commentary:  
 
A request for information relating to a group of 
unidentified taxpayers will be viewed as a ‘fishing 
expedition’-that is, speculative and lacking nexus-unless 
the requesting state can provide the following to the 
requested state: (1) a detailed description of the group, 
(2) the specific facts and circumstances underlying the 
request, (3) an explanation of the applicable law, and (4) 
‘why there is reason to believe that the taxpayers in the 
group for whom information is requested have been non-
compliant with that law supported by a clear factual 
basis.’ Furthermore, the requesting state must show that 
the requested information ‘would assist’ in determining 
whether the taxpayers in the group complied with the tax 
law.64  
 
While the requesting state still must supply a large amount of 
information about the beneficiary in order to make a request, the update 
to Article 26 has given the requesting state more power to track and 
identify beneficiaries. Even after the revision to Article 26, some 
scholars believe that information exchanged upon request is an 
inadequate measure when it comes to identifying anonymous 
beneficiaries because it requires that the requesting state already have 
detailed and specific information about the beneficiary.65 
 
                                                        
58 OECD, UPDATE 2012, supra note 54, at 1.  
59 Id.  
60 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7. 
61 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314. 
62 Id. 
63 OECD, UPDATE 2012, supra note 54, at 3. 
64 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314 n. 26 (citing the commentary to the OECD, UPDATE 2012, 
supra note 54, at 3). 
65 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 316.  
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2. FATF Recommendations 
 
The FATF is a policy making body established in 1989 whose 
objective is “to set standards and promote effective implementation of 
legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of 
the international financial system.” 66 The FATF has released a set of 
recommendations, most recently in 2012, which have been recognized as 
the international standard for combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 67  It is important to note that “[l]ike the products of other 
transgovernmental networks, the recommendations do not create legal 
obligations.”68 Instead, it is better to view the recommendations “as soft 
law or pledges by member states.”69 
Recommendation 10 addresses the problem of anonymous 
beneficiaries, recommending that financial institutions conduct Customer 
Due Diligence (CDD). 70  The recommendation impacts the setup of 
corporate vehicles, because it requires financial institutions to conduct 
CDD “when establishing business relations.” 71  CDD mandates that 
financial institutions identify the customer and verify that the customers 
are using reliable, independent source documents. 72  Further, CDD 
requires that institutions take reasonable measures to identify the 
beneficial owner.73  
Recommendation 11 also addresses problems related to anonymous 
beneficiaries because it requires financial institutions to maintain at least 
five years’ worth of records related to CDD measures. 74 The records 
would include passports, identity cards, driver’s licenses, and other 
identifying documents.75 The recommendation requires that these records 
be available to authorities upon request.76 
While Recommendations 10 and 11 would have beneficial 
implications on the fight against anonymous beneficiaries, their success 
is limited by the fact that the FATF’s “monitoring mechanisms cannot be 
applied to nonmember states.” 77  As a result, the FATF’s monitoring 
mechanisms are limited to the thirty-four member states.78 Furthermore, 
even if the state is a member, it does not mean that they have fully                                                         
66 Who We Are, FATF (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/.  
67 Id.  
68  Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the 
Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 
(2008).  
69 Id.  
70 FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 14.  
71 Id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id at 15. 
75 Id. 
76 FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 15. 
77 Blazejewski, supra note 68, at 18.  
78  See FATF Members and Observers, FATF (2014), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147. 
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complied with FATF Recommendations. 79  For example, the United 
States, a leading member of the FATF, was formally cited for failure to 
comply with the recommendations in 2006.80 While the United States 
substantially complies with the recommendations, the FATF’s Mutual 
Evaluation of the United States found that the United States did not 
follow the recommendations in regards to beneficial owners. 81 
Specifically, the FATF criticized the United States for not having strong 
identification requirements for beneficial owners, for not applying the 
recommendations to non-financial businesses, and for having company 
formation procedures and reporting requirements that do not provide 
adequate, accurate, or timely information on the beneficial ownership of 
legal persons. 82 In conclusion, while the FATF Recommendations do 
present solutions to many of the problems related to corporate vehicles, 
they fall short on remedying those problems. 
 
3. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
 
In 2010, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
became law in the United States.83 Beginning in 2014, FATCA required 
that U.S. persons and foreign entities with significant U.S. ownership 
report information about their foreign financial accounts directly to the 
IRS.84 “The rules are intended to provide reporting both on accounts held 
directly by individuals and on interests in accounts held by shell entities 
for the benefit of U.S. persons.”85 FATCA intends to punish financial 
institutions that do not comply by placing a withholding tax on payments 
from U.S. sources and income earned on U.S. investments by those 
financial institutions.86  
The goal of FATCA is to force all foreign financial institutions, 
including those that do not do business in the United States, to comply 
with the law of the United States.87 It seeks to achieve this goal by way 
of the pass-through provision in section 1471.88 Section 1471 requires 
complying foreign financial institutions to withhold payments to non-
complying foreign financial institutions in order to be fully compliant 
with FATCA.89                                                          
79 FATF Recommendations do not create legal obligations that must be followed by member 
states. See Blazejewski, supra note 68, at 10. 
80 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7.  
81 Mutual Evaluation of the United States, FATF (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-
z/unitedstates/documents/mutualevaluationoftheunitedstates.html 
82 Id. 
83  Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA. 
84 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 334. 
85 Id.  
86 See id. at 334–35.  
87 See id.at 336. 
88 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D) (2010). 
89 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 335. FATCA “was intended (1) to induce foreign financial 
institutions that are investing in or through participating financial institutions, but that are not 
investing in the United States, to also agree to participate in FATCA and (2) to disincline 
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FATCA also requires financial institutions to report or certify the 
ownership of all corporate vehicles that are not exempt under the 
regulations. Otherwise, they face the risk of being punished with a thirty 
percent withholding tax.90 This reporting obligation also arises out of 
section 1471, which requires financial institutions to report the 
ownership of a United States owned foreign entity. 91  Section 1471 
defines such an entity as one having “one or more substantial United 
States owners.” 92 The threshold of being a “substantial United States 
owner” according to FATCA requires ownership of “more than 10 
percent of the stock” in a corporation, rights to “more than 10 percent of 
the profits interests or capital interests” of a partnership, or indirectly or 
directly holding “10 percent beneficial interest” in a trust. 93  The act 
mandates that beneficial owners who seek to avoid the withholding tax 
submit: “(A) a certification that such beneficial owner does not have any 
substantial United States owners, or (B) the name, address, and TIN of 
each substantial United States owner of such beneficial owner.”94 As a 
result, FATCA not only requires disclosure of U.S. beneficiaries to 
foreign financial services, but also to the IRS. 
Despite the potential power of FATCA to discover the identities of 
anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles, it does have potential 
drawbacks and shortcomings. One commentator has argued that “the 
United States could neither implement broadly applicable [pass-through] 
payment withholding nor achieve near-comprehensive financial 
institution participation through unilateral measures alone.” 95  The 
unilateral nature of the law is an issue because the law only benefits the 
United States, and “places significant burdens on foreign financial 
services.”96 FATCA would also infringe on the sovereignty of foreign 
nations, because it could require the foreign financial services to violate 
contractual relationships, as well as data protection, bank secrecy, or 
other similar laws. 97 Some have even referred to FATCA as a “new 
American imperialism.” 98  Consequently, the United States has begun 
entering into bilateral agreements with some foreign nations, in order to 
avoid state sovereignty issues. 99  Ultimately, because the law did not                                                                                                                             
participating foreign financial institutions from doing business with nonparticipating financial 
institutions because business between participating and nonparticipating financial institutions may 
require withholding under U.S. law.” Id. at 335–36.  
90  About FATCA, DELOITTE (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_us/us/930c9948e681a210VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm. 
91 26 U.S.C. § 1471. 
92 Id. 
93 26 U.S.C. § 1473(2)(A) (2010).  
94 26 U.S.C. § 1472(b)(1) (date of code edition cited). 
95 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 336. 
96 Id.  
97 See id.  
98 Robert W. Wood, G-8 Nations Take on Tax Evasion, Tax Havens and More, FORBES (June 
19, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/06/19/g-8-nations-take-on-tax-evasion-tax-
havens-and-more/.  
99 In February 2012, the United States entered into bilateral agreements with France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which calls for an automatic exchange of information 
pursuant to FATCA. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 337. 
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officially take effect until 2014, it is still too early to tell how successful 
it will be at identifying U.S. persons who are hiding as anonymous 
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles.   
 
II. THE G8 PRINCIPLES 
 
The United Kingdom acted as president of the G8 in 2013.100 Its 
leader, Prime Minister David Cameron, announced the following goals 
of the summit: advancing trade, ensuring tax compliance, and promoting 
transparency.101 One notable development from the G8 summit was that 
it decided to support the G20 and the OECD’s call for the adoption of a 
multilateral automatic exchange of information on beneficiaries.102 The 
G8 called for the implementation of this new global standard as soon as 
possible. 103  Prime Minister David Cameron’s communiqué from the 
summit officially addressed the issues regarding the abuse of corporate 
vehicles.104 The G8 leaders agreed to “make a concerted and collective 
effort to tackle [the misuse of shell companies] and improve the 
transparency of companies and legal arrangements.” 105  In addition to 
reaffirming the G8 member countries’ commitment to implement 
FATF’s Recommendations, the leaders agreed to publish national action 
plans based off of the G8 Principles, which were published on June 18, 
2013.106  
The G8 believes that these principles are “essential to ensure the 
integrity of beneficial ownership and basic company information [and] 
the timely access to such information by law enforcement for 
investigative purposes.”107 There are eight separate principles within the 
G8 Principles, each of which will be explained below. 
The first principle requires companies to “know who owns and 
controls them and their beneficial ownership.”108 In order to fulfill this 
requirement, companies would be required to keep records of their 
ownership. Companies have the burden to make sure that the basic 
ownership and beneficial ownership information is adequate, accurate, 
and current.109  
The second principle addresses the availability of ownership 
information to relevant authorities. 110  “Countries should consider 
measures to facilitate access to company beneficial ownership 
                                                        
100 See UK Presidency of G8 2013, supra note 20.  
101 See id.  
102 See 2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders' Communiqué, GOV.UK, 6–7 (June 18, 2013), available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2013-lough-erne-g8-leaders-communique. 
103 See id. at 1.  
104 See id.  
105 See id. at 7. 
106 See id. at 8. 
107 G8 Principles, supra note 6.  
108 Id. at Principle 1. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at Principle 2. 
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information by financial institutions and other regulated businesses.”111 
This second principle suggests that states could make companies register 
beneficial ownership information on central registries at the national or 
state level.112 
The third principle addresses the abuse of trusts by anonymous 
beneficiaries.113 It requires a trustee of an express trust to know who the 
beneficial owners of that trust are.114 In doing so, the trustee would be 
required to have information on both the beneficiaries and settlors of the 
trust.115 This information must be made available to law enforcement and 
other relevant authorities.116 
The fourth principle focuses on educating authorities on the 
weaknesses within their anti-money laundering and terrorism finance 
prevention methods. 117  In order to carry out this principle, risk 
assessments should be conducted by each state and the results should be 
shared both with relevant authorities as well as other states.118 The goal 
of this principle is to expose risks and implement effective measures to 
enhance the respective state’s methods.119  
The fifth principle is designed to combat the use of abusive financial 
instruments and shareholding structures that successfully provide 
beneficiaries with anonymity.120 The principle specifically states that the 
abuse of mechanisms “such as bearer shares and nominee shareholders 
and directors, should be prevented.”121 
The sixth principle is designed to place additional burdens on 
financial institutions as well as trust and company service providers.122 It 
suggests that states should place customer identification and verification 
obligations on those institutions, in order to make sure that beneficiaries 
are properly vetted.123 The principle further suggests that states should 
“ensure effective supervision of these obligations.”124 
The seventh principle addresses enforcement mechanisms that 
should be employed by states against companies and financial 
institutions that do not comply with their obligations.125 This principle 
advocates the use of “[e]ffective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” 
that are to be “robustly enforced” by the states.126 This principle would 
require states to sanction institutions that do not conduct proper CDD                                                         
111 Id. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at Principle 3. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. at Principle 4.  
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at Principle 5. 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at Principle 6. 
123 See id. 
124 Id. 
125 See id. at Principle 7. 
126 Id. at Principle 7. 
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according to FATF Recommendations.127  
The eighth principle addresses the need for international cooperation 
for information exchange between states regarding the abuse of corporate 
vehicles.128 This principle proposes that national authorities should be 
encouraged by states to “rapidly, constructively, and effectively provide 
basic company and beneficial ownership information upon request from 
foreign counterparts.”129 
In order to ensure that the G8 members fulfill their commitment to 
publish national action plans, based on the above principles, and take 
actions pursuant to those plans, the G8 agreed “to a process of self 
reporting [sic] through a public update on the progress made against 
individual action plans and to inform the Financial Action Task 
Force.”130  
 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
While the principles were designed knowing “a one-size-fits all 
approach may not be the most effective”131 approach, the core of the G8 
Principles establishes a standard for the identification of beneficial 
owners that could have profound impact on the fight against the abuse of 
corporate vehicles. This section will expound upon the potential impact 
and limitations that may exist in that regard.  
 
A. Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements 
 
The G8 Principles reinforce and expand upon the FATF 
Recommendations. For example, both the G8 Principles and the FATF 
Recommendations aim to promote the disclosure of information 
regarding the identities of beneficiaries.132 One key difference is that the 
FATF Recommendations focus on financial institutions, while the G8 
Principles extend the burden to the companies themselves.133 It appears 
that the G8 Principles are attempting to kill the weed (abuse of corporate 
vehicles) as close to the root (the anonymous beneficiaries) as possible. 
This distinction has vast implications because it makes corporations 
directly responsible for their information at the risk of being 
sanctioned. 134  The G8 Principles would require corporations to keep                                                         
127 Id. For discussion on CCD procedures, see infra Part I, section C, FATF Recommendations.  
128 See G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 8. 
129 Id. 
130 G8 Principles, supra note 6. 
131 Id. 
132  Both Principle 1 of the G8 Principles and Recommendation 10 of the FATF 
Recommendations share the same goal of requiring disclosure of the identities of beneficiaries. See 
G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 1; FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 14. 
133 This distinction is discovered by comparing the language of the FATF Recommendations 
and the G8 Principles. The FATF Recommendations reference “financial institutions,” while the G8 
Principles make references to “companies” specifically. Compare G8 Principles, supra note 6, at 
Principle 1, with FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 14. 
134 See G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 7 (allowing for “robustly enforced” sanctions 
to be used against non-complying companies). 
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records of their ownership. While financial institutions and corporate 
service providers would still be required to gather and verify ownership 
information,135 the G8 Principles seek to increase the effectiveness of 
those measures by focusing on the companies, which supply that 
information to those institutions. This would, for example, place the 
burden on companies to know who actually possesses their bearer shares.  
A potential drawback to this scheme could arise when corporate 
vehicles are less than willing to gather and record the necessary 
information. Furthermore, it is unclear who will be responsible for 
gathering that information in a shell company. Most shell companies, as 
the name implies, are nothing but empty shells with no real operations;136 
they do not have employees, executives, or even active directors whose 
responsibility it would be to gather the necessary information. This 
situation is analogous to telephoning a closed business and trying to 
make a request where there is hardly any chance that the message would 
be received, let alone acted upon. In order to remedy this problem, the 
sanctions supported by the G8 Principles137 must be strong enough to 
force compliance. Sanctions such as freezing the assets of a non-
compliant corporate vehicle, while extreme, would certainly get a 
beneficiary’s attention.  
 
B. Role of Central Registries 
 
The second G8 Principle recommends that states should make 
company information available on central registries.138 Coupled with the 
recommendations for companies to turn over “adequate, accurate, and 
current” information about beneficiaries, this provision could be very 
successful in identifying anonymous beneficiaries. 139  Currently, most 
states already have central registries, which record information about 
companies. However, each one differs as to what types of information 
are required to set up a company. 140  Central registries will be more 
effective as a result of raising the standard for what information needs to 
be turned over and recorded. Another way that central registries can be 
more effective is the establishment of national registries for all corporate 
vehicles, including trusts. In jurisdictions like the United States and the 
United Kingdom, individual states and dependencies are allowed to have                                                         
135 See id. at Principle 8.  
136 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 24. 
137  The G8 principles do not provide examples regarding what sort of sanctions they 
recommend; they leave it up to the member states to create and enforce “[e]ffective, proportionate 
and dissuasive sanctions.”  See G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 7.  
138 See G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 8. 
139 Id. at Principle 7.  
140 For example, in the United States, some states require less information to create a company 
than to obtain a driver’s license. See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 4; see also Dean 
Kalant, Who’s In Charge Here? Requiring More Transparency In Corporate America: 
Advancements In Beneficial Ownership For Privately Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1049, 1051 (2009) (stating that in the United States “transparency of ownership requirements vastly 
differs from state to state”).  
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their own central registries.141 The advantages of a national registry are 
twofold. First, a national registry allows for one standard regarding 
required information pertaining to beneficial owners. Second, a national 
registry will ultimately increase the accessibility of information to law 
enforcement, tax authorities, and foreign governments because the 
information will be stored in one central location.  
It is possible to see the potential of an effectively established central 
registry by looking at the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) Offshore Leaks Database. 142  The ICIJ recently 
published the Offshore Leaks Database on June 14, 2013.143 Readers are 
allowed to search the database for information about the beneficiaries of 
more than 100,000 offshore entities in tax havens. 144  This database 
performs the function that a central registry could perform, but on an 
international scale. It includes information on shell companies, trusts, 
and funds that are located in traditionally secretive jurisdictions such as 
the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, and 
Singapore.145 Unlike an official registry, the Offshore Leaks Database is 
limited by the information that the ICIJ can uncover. As a result, the 
database is not always capable of revealing a corporate vehicle’s true 
owners. 146  This is where central registries would have a significant 
advantage. They would be able to lean on the power of their respective 
states to increase the disclosure of information about beneficiaries.147 
One problem with central registries is the lack of uniform standards for 
the specific types of information that they need to obtain. However, 
members designed the G8 Principles to become a universal standard that 
outlines the types of information that ought to be required. If the central 
registries adopt the G8 Principles as the universal standard, they will be 
well-positioned to supply agencies and governments with information 
that will aid in the fight against tax evasion, money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Indeed, these are some of the biggest problems 
surrounding shell corporations.   
 
C. The Information Exchange Standard 
 
The G8 Principles require that companies track ownership, and 
disclose that information to domestic authorities, such as central                                                         
141 See, e.g., Delaware Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV, http://corp.delaware.gov/ 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (United States); The Department of Economic Development, ISLE OF 
MAN GOVERNMENT, http://www.gov.im/ded/companies/companiesregistry.xml (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013) (United Kingdom).  
142 The Offshore Leaks Database can be found at http://offshoreleaks.icij.org/search.  
143 See Marina Walker Guevara, ICIJ Releases Offshore Leaks Database Revealing Names 
Behind Secret Companies, Trusts (June 14, 2013), available at http://www.icij.org/offshore/icij-
releases-offshore-leaks-database-revealing-names-behind-secret-companies-trusts.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
147  The potential use of sanctions and other “measures to facilitate access to company 
beneficial ownership information” by states could be relied upon by central registries. See G8 
Principles, supra note 6, at Principles 2 and 7. 
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registries. The eighth principle of the G8 Principles is the most important 
because it addresses getting company ownership information into the 
hands of foreign jurisdictions that need it for enforcement purposes.148 
Despite the G8 support of an automatic exchange of information, the G8 
Principles still only require information to be exchanged “upon 
request.”149 Furthermore, the G8 principles do not specify the type of 
information that needs to be presented by the requesting country to make 
a valid request regarding company ownership. The prevailing 
international norms for a valid information request stem from the OECD 
Model Treaty. Thus, it is likely that the countries implementing the G8 
principles will follow the OECD Model Treaty’s requirements. 150  As 
discussed in Part I, the OECD Model Treaty would require that the 
requesting state possess a great deal of information in order to make a 
valid request; it must be more than just “fishing expeditions.”151 
Fortunately, the leaders of the international community voiced their 
support for revising the OECD Model Treaty to mandate an automatic 
exchange of information. 152  As a result, information about the 
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles such as “shell companies, special 
purpose companies and trust arrangements,” could soon be subject to the 
automatic exchange. 153  Consequently, information pertaining to 
corporate beneficiaries would be made available to the states where those 
beneficiaries are citizens and are subject to domestic taxes. While the G8 
Principles place the burden on the OECD to mandate an automatic 
exchange, its support will greatly increase the likelihood that the 
automatic exchange mandate becomes a reality.  
 
D. How Influential Will the Agreement Be? 
 
One of the key limitations of the G8 Principles is that only eight 
states are obligated to abide by them. In spite of this, the G8 Principles 
remain influential on an international level because of the G8’s economic 
strength. 154  Nevertheless, because it takes time for the international 
community to build consensus and make changes, the most immediate 
effects of the G8 Principles will come from within the member states. 
This is because the G8 will need to look no further than itself to find tax 
havens that will be affected by the G8 Principles.                                                         
148 See G8 Principles, supra note 6, at Principle 8.  
149 Id.   
150 See OECD, UPDATE 2012, supra note 54, at 1; supra Part I, Section C, OECD Model Tax 
Convention.  
151 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314. 
152  See 2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders' Communiqué, supra note 102, at 6–7. 
153  G8 summit Agrees on New Measure to Clamp Money Laundering and Corporate Tax 
Avoiders, MercoPress (June 19, 2013), available at http://en.mercopress.com/2013/06/19/g8-
summit-agrees-on-new-measure-to-clamp-money-laundering-and-corporate-tax-avoiders 
[hereinafter G8 Summit Agrees]. 
154 Stephanie Lee, Alexandra Silver, & Zachary Laub, The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized 
Nations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 14, 2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/global-
governance/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations/p10647 (“The aggregate GDP of the G8 makes up 
some 50 percent of the global economy.”). 
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1. The United Kingdom 
 
“About one-fifth of offshore tax havens, which are used by 
multinationals to shelter cash from the tax authorities, are British 
dependencies.”155 Some of those tax havens include: Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Anguilla, Montserrat, Turks 
and Caicos, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. 156  The United 
Kingdom has aggressively addressed its tax haven problem by securing 
“agreements from all the British Overseas Territories and Crown 
Dependencies to publish their own action plans.” 157  In addition, the 
United Kingdom has announced a deal with its crown dependencies and 
overseas territories that will mandate an exchange of information. The 
mandated exchange of information will be in regards to which foreign 
companies bank their profits in those jurisdictions.158 
The United Kingdom released its action plan on June 18, 2013.159 
Ahead of the 2013 G8 summit, the United Kingdom had begun planning 
the establishment of a registry that would contain information about 
companies and their owners. 160  This registry of beneficial ownership 
would potentially be made available to the public and would “make it 
clear” who was ultimately benefiting from the use of corporate 
vehicles.161 On July 15, 2013, the plan for the creation of a registry was 
published in a discussion paper called The Transparency & Trust: 
Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing 
Trust in UK Business.162  
The discussion paper addresses several key areas related to the abuse 
of corporate vehicles that were also addressed in the G8 Principles. The 
paper proposes that the registry should hold information about the 
beneficiaries of every company that is incorporated in the United 
Kingdom.163 It discusses “what information should be provided to the                                                         
155 G8 Summit Agrees, supra note 1533.  
156 Wood, supra note 98. 
157 G8 2013: New Rules to Bring Unprecedented Transparency on Company Ownership, HM 
TREASURY (June 15, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g8-2013-new-rules-to-bring-
unprecedented-transparency-on-company-ownership.  
158  See G8 Summit Agrees, supra note 1534. 
159  See PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, 10 DOWNING STREET, UK ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT 
MISUSE OF COMPANIES AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS (2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-action-plan-to-prevent-misuse-of-companies-and-
legal-arrangements.  
160 G8 2013: New Rules to Bring Unprecedented Transparency on Company Ownership, supra 
note 1578; see also Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company 
Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business, Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
(July 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212079/bis-13-959-
transparency-and-trust-enhancing-the-transparency-of-uk-company-ownership-and-increaing-trust-
in-uk-business.pdf [hereinafter UK Plan].  
161 G8 summit: George Osborne Unveils Tax Register Plan, BBC News (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22949338 [hereinafter George Osborne].  
162 Sabrina Davis, Enhancing Transparency of UK Company Ownership, GOWLINGS (August 
2013), http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/article.asp?pubID=2977. 
163 See UK Plan, supra note 160, at 5.  
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registry; how frequently it should be updated; and how to ensure that it is 
as accurate as possible.”164 It also demonstrates the United Kingdom’s 
intent to give all companies the necessary statutory tools to identify their 
beneficial ownership; and the United Kingdom’s willingness to 
determine “what additional requirements might be required to ensure 
beneficial ownership information on all companies is indeed 
obtained.”165 The paper also advocates the prohibition of the creation of 
new bearer shares, the conversion of existing bearer shares into 
registered shares, and more transparency related to nominee directors.166  
It is worth noting that the paper does acknowledge the limitations to 
the United Kingdom’s proposed registry. For example, it states that it 
“cannot require overseas companies operating in the UK to disclose 
beneficial ownership information to a UK registry.” 167  The United 
Kingdom is aware of some of the state sovereignty issues that FATCA 
has encountered.168 As a result, it calls for a more coordinated action at 
the E.U. and global level.169  
 
2. The United States 
 
The White House released its Action Plan on June 18, 2013.170 The 
United States pledged to create legislation aimed at addressing the 
“‘criminal’ use of shell companies by forcing firms to declare their actual 
or beneficial ownership.” 171  That pledge could be fulfilled by the 
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which 
was introduced on August 1, 2013 by Senators Carl Levin, Chuck 
Grassley, Dianne Feinstein, and Tom Harkin.172  
In Senator Levin’s floor statement introducing the bill, he stated that:  
 
[the] bill would end the practice of our States forming 
about 2 million new corporations each year for 
unidentified persons, and instead require a list of the real 
owners to be submitted so that, if misconduct later 
occurred, law enforcement could access the owners list 
and have a trail to chase, instead of confronting what has 
all too often been a dead end.173                                                         
164 See id.   
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 See UK Plan, supra note 160, at 27, section 2.23.  
168 See supra Part I, Section C, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.  
169 See UK Plan, supra note 160, at 27, section 2.23. 
170  Press Release, The White House, United States G-8 Action Plan for Transparency of 
Company Ownership and Control (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/06/18/united-states-g-8-action-plan-transparency-company-ownership-and-
control. 
171 See George Osborne, supra note 161, at 1. 
172 Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th Cong. 
(2013).  
173  Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Senate Floor Statement on Introduction of the 
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
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The Act seeks to achieve this goal by requiring that beneficial ownership 
information be collected either by the countries directly or through 
licensed formation agents. 174  Furthermore, it would require the 
information175 on the beneficiaries of corporate vehicles formed under 
State law to be obtained, updated, and available upon the request of a 
relevant agency.176 The Act also addresses shelf corporations and extends 
the beneficiary identification obligations to agents who sell them.177 
To ease the transition to the new rules, states would be given a two-
year transition period. This would give them time to set up mechanisms 
to begin requesting information about the beneficiaries of existing 
corporate vehicles. 178  The main enforcement mechanism for this Act 
would be the use of state compliance reports that would occur every five 
years.179 The reports would identify any states that have not complied 
with the Act180 and would allow Congress to determine if further action 
from the Federal Government is needed in order to address any lingering 
issues related to the abuse of corporate vehicles.181  
The Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance 
Act, was introduced in response to United States’ G8 Action Plan and 
embodies many of the principles from the G8 Principles.182 It could have 
a profound effect on the use of shell corporations because it is “easier to 
obtain an anonymous shell company in the United States than almost 
anywhere else in the world.”183 Currently, the bill is in front of a Senate 
committee.184  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The G8’s support of an automatic exchange of information between 
tax authorities and the G8 Principles’ increased reporting and recording 
requirements relating to the identities of beneficiaries are major steps in 
policing tax avoidance, money laundering, and other financial crimes 
involving anonymous corporate vehicles. If the G8 Principles are                                                                                                                             
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/senate-floor-statement-on-introduction-of-
the-incorporation-transparency-and-law-enforcement-assistance-act [hereinafter Senate Floor 
Statement].  
174  Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Summary of Incorporation Transparency and Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/summary-of-incorporation-transparency-and-
law-enforcement-assistance-act_-august-1-2013 [hereinafter Act Summary].  
175 Identifying information such as the names and addresses of beneficiaries would need to be 
obtained, as well as a U.S. driver’s license or passport number, or information from a non-U.S. 
passport. See id.  
176 See id.  
177 See id.  
178 See id.   
179 See id. 
180 See Act Summary, supra note 1744. 
181 Id.  
182 See Senate Floor Statement, supra note 173.  
183 Id (citing results from a Griffith University study).  
184 Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, supra note 172. 
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effective, beneficiaries will undoubtedly have a much harder time 
gaining and maintaining anonymity.  
The next steps involve revising the OECD Model Treaty to institute 
automatic exchanges and increasing pressures on countries to comply 
with the standards set out within the G8 Principles. The automatic 
exchange will undoubtedly fail to prevent the abuse of corporate vehicles 
if countries do not record beneficiary information when corporations are 
established and ownership changes hands. Without more countries 
buying in, especially known tax havens, the international community has 
a long way to go before corporate vehicles are no longer used for illicit 
purposes. Benjamin Franklin once said that “[v]ice knows that she is 
ugly, so she puts on her mask.” 185  It seems that the international 
community has finally recognized that it is time for anonymous 
beneficiaries to be forced to take off their masks. 
 
                                                        
185 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 33.  
